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COMMENTS
Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases
I.

A.

THE LOUISIANA RULES ON SCOPE OF REVIEW

Introduction-

The Manifest ErrorRule

The jurisprudence of Louisiana appears settled beyond doubt
that findings of fact made by a trial court will not be upset on
appeal unless deemed "manifestly erroneous" by the appellate
court.' The manifest error rule is often stated to be so well set1. The vast majority of cases involving factual problems on appeal contain
statements attesting to the universal applicability of the manifest error rule.
The Louisiana Digest lists upwards of 1000 manifest error cases. In Succession
of Fields, 222 La. 310, 319, 62 So.2d 495, 498 (1952), the court stated: "Counsel
for defendant makes reference to 500 cases or more to the effect that a judgment
of the trial court on questions of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless
manifestly erroneous." In The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
Procedure, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 261, 268 (1948),
1946-1947 Term -Civil
[402]
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tled as to warrant no citations of support,2 and is articulated in
most of the cases involving factual questions on appeal. At the
outset, it should be noted that this doctrine receives a variety of
types of application in the cases. In some, it appears fairly clear
that the appellate court was in full accord with the factual conclusions drawn by the trial court, and invoked the manifest error
rule merely as additional support for an already well-supported
affirmance. 3 In other cases, it appears that the doctrine is invoked in order to allow the appellate court to avoid stating which
way it would have decided the case at the trial level, or to avoid
reproducing or analyzing a lengthy or detailed trial court opinion.4 The applications of the manifest error rule to which this
Comment is primarily directed might be termed the decisive uses
of the doctrine. I.e., in a minor number of cases, the appellate
court will state that the trial court's conclusions were manifestly
erroneous and therefore must be overturned. 5 In other cases,
the appellate court may express disagreement with the conclusions reached by the trial court, but state that the court below
was not so clearly incorrect as to be manifestly in error. In both
of these latter types of cases, it may be said that the outcome of
the appeal turned on the extent of applicability and meaning of
the manifest error doctrine.
it was stated: "The settled rule that the trial court's findings of fact will not be
disturbed on appeal unless deemed manifestly erroneous received its annual application in three of the decisions of the supreme court."
2. See Schlesinger v. Fontenot, 235 La. 47, 59, 102 So.2d 488, 493 (1958)
State v. Ragusa, 234 La. 51, 59, 99 So.2d 20, 23 (1958) ; Jones v. Jones, 232 La.
102, 105, 93 So.2d 917, 918 (1957) ; Kruse v. Kruse, 175 La. 206, 207, 143 So. 50
(1932). In Rosenthal v. Gauthier, 224 La. 341, 346, 69 So.2d 367, 368 (1953),
the court speaks of "the long line of precedent as to not overruling the trial
judge's factual findings unless manifestly erroneous and the uniformity of a
constant repetition of this rule."
3. See Jones v. Jones, 232 La. 102, 93 So.2d 917 (1957) ; Olivier v. Abunza,
226 La. 456, 76 So.2d 528 (1954); Guin v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 224 La.
44, 68 So.2d 752 (1953); Nalty v. Nalty, 222 La. 911, 64 So.2d 216 (1953);
Harkness v. Leggett, 171 La. 405, 131 So. 190 (1930); Burt v. Burt, 1G0 La.
387, 107 So. 234 (1926) ; Harrison v. Goldberg, 133 La. 389, 63 So. 59 (1913) ;
Thomason v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 122 La. 995, 48 So. 432 (1909) ; James
v. Rapides Lumber Co., 50 La. Ann. 717, 23 So. 469 (1898) ; Johnson v. Houston
Fire & Casualty Co., 66 So.2d 528 (La. App. 1953).
4. An excellent example of a case where it is impossible to determine whether
the appellate court was in accord with the trial court is Ponder v. Coyle, 164
La. 905, 114 So. 729 (1927). See Holmes Co. v. Foret, 229 La. 360, 86 So.2d 66
(1956) ; McMahon v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co., 227 La. 777, 80
So.2d 405 (1955) ; Grau v. Consolidated Dredging & Mfg. Co., 162 La. 205, 110
So. 202 (1926)
Williams v. Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co., 121 La. 438, 46,
So. 528 (1908)
Brady v. Jay, 111 L . 1071, 36 So. 132 (1904); The Third
Municipality of New Orleans v. Blanc, I La. Ann. 385 (1846).
- 5. See Huber v. Ed Taussig, Inc., 228 La. 1018, 84 So.2d 806
(1956) ; Moore
v. Lelong, 226 La. 962, 77 So.2d 729 (1955); Fridge v. Talbert, 180 La. 937,
158 So. 209 (1934) ; Brewster v. Emlet, 168 La. 326, 122 So. 54 (1929).
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Although the origins of the manifest error doctrine are obscure,8 it seems safe to assume, in the light of the constitutional
provision charging Louisiana's appellate courts with reconsideration of the facts in civil cases, 7 that in its inception the rule
6. Apparently the earliest reported cases in Louisiana contain statements of
the rule differing in no appreciable respect from the language of the latest cases.
See Klein v. Dinkgrave, 4 La. Ann. 540, 541 (1849) ("It is not our province to
disturb the opinion of a district judge or the verdict of a jury with regard to
questions of fact, unless where such opinion or verdict appears to us manifestly
erroneous.") ; Henderson v. Beale's Curator, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 228, 229 (La. 1826)
("The case turns entirely on a question of fact. The judge has concluded from
the testimony before him that the deceased . . . fully paid what he owed to the
transferor; we cannot say he erred in doing so, and in a case like this the opinion
of the judge below has great weight in this court.") ; Pascal v. Caldwell, 3 Mart.
(N.S.) 175, 176 (La. 1824) ("the first judgment prevails with us, unless manifestly wrong") ; Boissier's Syndics v. Belair, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 29, 30 (La. 1824)
("The decision of the suit now depends solely on matters of fact; and in similar
cases we have long been in the habit of yielding much to the conclusions of the
courts of the first instance: whether evidence may have been weighed by a judge
or by a jury") ; Walton v. Grant, 2 Mart.(N.S.) 494 (La. 1824) ("The question
presented is one of fact alone, and the rule established in this court is, that the
decision in the inferior tribunal always governs here, unless it clearly appears to
be erroneous.") ; Boismarre v. Jourdan, 1 Mart.(N.S.) 304, 306 (La. 1823) ("we
adopt the conclusion of the court of the first instance, as we always do on questions of fact, unless the decision is clearly erroneous") ; Soubie's Executor v.
Beale, 1 Mart.(N.S.) 95, 96 (La. 1823) ("there is not such evident error in the
judgment of the court below . . . as to require its reversal") ; Moore v. Angiolette,
12 Mart.(O.S.) 532, 533 (La. 1823) ("We agree in the conclusions of the district
judge, whose decision, on questions of fact, always prevails in this court, unless
manifestly erroneous." It will be noted that the Moore decision was rendered in
1823, and gives no citations in support of the proposition quoted.).
7. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(6) : "In all civil and probate cases where the
Supreme Court is given appellate jurisdiction, the appeal shall be both upon the
law and the facts."
Id. art. VII, § 29: "The Courts of Appeal shall have appellate jurisdiction
[where]

. . . the Supreme Court is not given jurisdiction, . . . and all appeals

shall be both upon the law and the facts."
The consequences of the inclusion of appellate fact review in a judicial system
are far-reaching. A major effect has been the relative scarcity of civil jury trials.
This scarcity is usually ascribed to a feeling that appellate scrutiny of the facts
of a case negatives any advantages of sympathy or pooled intuition which might
be had in a jury trial. It should be noted that the scope of appellate review
appears the same whether the trier of fact be judge or jury; the manifest error
rule applies with equal force in either case. Gilliand v. Feibleman's, Inc., 161
La. 24, 28, 108 So. 112, 113 (1926) : "The jurisprudence of this state does not
attach greater importance to the verdict of a jury than to judgments of a trial
court upon questions of fact. Where the proof is doubtful, or a fair preponderance
of the proof is not clearly ascertainable from the record, weight is given to the
verdict of the jury or the judgment appealed from, and neither will be disturbed,
but otherwise this court will render such judgment as, in its opinion, should have
been rendered in the court below. That is all that the frequently but loosely used
expression 'great weight is given to the verdict of a jury' means." See Burt v.
Burt, 160 La. 387, 107 So. 234 (1926) ; Moret v. New Orleans Rys., 112 La.
863, 36 So. 759 (1904) ; Klein v. Dinkgrave, 4 La. Ann. 540 (1849) ; Boialer's
Syndics v. Belair, 3 Mart. (N.S.) 29 (La. 1824) ; Roux v. Attardo, 93 So.2d 332
(La. App. 1957). Perhaps contra is McGinn v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co.,
118 La. 811, 43 So. 450 (1907). There a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff who
had fallen while riding on a street car and broken her leg was overturned. The
court stated: "Were the facts such as plaintiff's counsel claim them to have
been, the jury should have accorded a larger amount than it did. The verdict
was evidently a sympathetic one. Juries cannot be sustained in indulging in
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was intended to operate as a limitation upon the freedom with
which the appellate court would overturn the trial court's factual
conclusions. The jurisprudence would seem to bear out this
assumption. While it seems impossible to determine the precise
extent to which the doctrine has limited the scope of appellate
review of findings of fact, it is a virtual certainty that appellate
courts have to some undefined extent felt themselves limited by
the rule.8 Equally well settled, at least in theory, is the scope of
appellate review on questions of law. Here, the appellate court
is subject to no doctrinal restrictions in its reconsideration of the
sympathy on insufficient evidence at the expense of other persons." Id. at 822,
43 So. at 454.
Appellate fact review, and the infrequency of civil jury trials, having affected substantive law to a very great extent. For discussion of the comparative
consequences of jury and non-jury trials in tort cases, see Malone, Damage Suits
and the Coftagious Principle of Workmen's Compensation, 12 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEw 231, 237 (1952). For discussion of some mechanical differences between
judge-tried and jury-tried cases, which differences have substantive bearing, see
Sunderland, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Cases Where Juries Are
Waived, 4 U. CI. L. REv. 218 (1936).
The effects of appellate fact review upon rules of evidence have often been
cited. In Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Madden, 219 F.2d 205 (5th
Cir. 1955), the court of appeals affirmed a trial court denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Defendant's motion was grounded upon the contention
that plaintiff had not introduced enough evidence to take the case before the
jury. The court noted that the fact that Louisiana appellate courts review facts
as well as law makes it impossible to determine the state substantive law relative to sufficiency of evidence. See Comment, 30 TUL. L. REV. 462, 473 (1956).
In criminal cases, appeal lies only as to questions of law. LA. CONST. art.
VII, § 10(7).
For discussion of the system of appellate review in Louisiana as applied to
juvenile courts, see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1947-1948
Term -Criminal
Procedure, 9 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 252, 276 (1949); Comment, 8 LOUISIANA LAW RaviEv 415 (1948).

8. A good example of a reluctant affirmance brought about by the manifest
error limitation is Nissen v. Farquhar, 123 La. 192, 48 So. 885 (1909), where a
trial court grant of a separation from bed and board was affirmed. "The whole
case depends upon which set of witnesses are [sic] to be believed. The trial
judge believed those of plaintiff. . . . The parties have been living apart since
March, 1906, and are unlikely to live again together, even though a legal separation were refused them. We cannot be positive that the trial judge, who saw and
heard the witnesses, had erred; hence we find ourselves compelled to affirm his
judgment- somewhat reluctantly, toe admit." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 193,
48 So. at 889. Another example of the limiting effect of the manifest error doctrine is the recent court of appeal case of Knighten v. American Automobile
Insurance Co., 121 So.2d 344 (La. App. 1960). There, an automobile driven by
defendant's insured collided with a pick-up truck in which plaintiff was a guest
passenger. In a prior action by the driver of the automobile against the driver
of the truck, the court of appeal had held that a jury finding on reconventional
demand that the automobile driver (defendant's insured) had been guilty of
negligence was not manifestly erroneous. In the instant action plaintiff contended
that this prior holding meant that here the automobile driver must be counted
as negligent. The court rejected this contention, and held that the jury finding
in the instant case that the driver of the automobile had been guilty of no negligence was not manifestly erroneous. Thus, on the same issue of fact, the same
court of appeal examined two diametrically opposed jury findings, and held neither
of them to be manifestly erroneous.
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case, and will substitute its own judgment for that of the trial
court with relative freedom. Substitution of judgment means
that the reviewing court in theory attaches no special weight to
the conclusions of the lower court, and, for purposes of discussion at least, may be counted as the broadest possible rule of
scope of review. At the other extreme, absolute inviolability of
the trial court's conclusions would be the narrowest possible
scope of review. The manifest error rule lies at some undefined
point between these two extremes. The appellate tribunal, in
reviewing a finding of fact made by a trial court, will inquire
into the facts of the case with a view to determining whether
the trial court has been manifestly wrong.9 Reversal will not
follow from mere disagreement on the part of the appellate
court, but must be predicated upon something more. This "something more" is visualized as the focal point of this Comment.
B.

Elasticity of the Rules

At the outset, the impossibility of imprisoning in words the
precise extent to which appellate courts will interfere with the
findings of fact of trial courts should be firmly in mind. Such
formulae as the manifest error rule are inevitably elusive and
variant, since the deference to be paid the findings of the trial
court will to some extent always be an individual matter, dependent upon such factors as the propensity of the appellate court to
exercise sweeping or limited review, the nature of the subject
matter at hand, and whether the appellate court feels as a matter of policy that it is desirable to affirm or to reverse. This is
not to say that attempts at definition and clarification of principles governing scope of review should be abandoned. However,
it does illustrate that these principles should be viewed as flexible, elastic concepts, rather than as iron-clad doctrines. The
9. A Louisiana appellate court, on finding a trial
to be in error, ordinarily will not, as is the practice in
the case for further consideration on the facts, but
determinations of fact. See Richard v. Cain, 168 La.

court's conclusion
most jurisdictions,
will simply make
608, 122 So. 866

of fact
remand
its own
(1929).

There the appellate court considered evidence which had been excluded in the
trial court. Sometimes, however, a case will be remanded, particularly where a
remand on the facts is tantamount to a reversal. See White v. White, 161 La.
718, 109 So. 399 (1926), where, in an adultery case, the trial court gave judgment
for plaintiff-husband, refusing to hear any more evidence after deciding not to
believe the wife. The Supreme Court remanded, the tenor of the opinion clearly
indicating that the outcome of the case should be denial of the divorce. Of course,
if it is necessary to hear further testimony or acquire other evidence not already
of record in order to reach a finding, of necessity the appellate court will remand
the case, having no machinery for hearing witnesses or examining other evidence.

See Dunn v. Springfield Fire & Marine ins. Co., 109 La. 520, 33 So. 585 (1902).
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extent of review will ordinarily depend more upon the individual
circumstances of a case than upon the wording of the applicable
rule of scope of review.
Definitions of the mtanifest errorrude. With this elasticity in
mind, some apparently contradictory Louisiana jurisprudence is
more easily understood. Many apparent discrepancies may be
seen in the cases, both in attempted definitions of the manifest
error rule, and in its application. Definitions of manifest error
have ranged from statements such as "when such error is manifest, it should be easy to point it out" 10 (the court apparently
seeing the manifest error doctrine as somehow equated with the
appellant's burden of establishing error") to the more eloquent
10. Sunseri v. Westbank Motors, 228 La. 370, 379, 82 So.2d 43, 46 (1955).
11. There appear to be great possibilities for confusion in attempting to
interrelate the manifest error concept, the plaintiff's burden of proof at the trial
level, and the appellant's burden of establishing error. In Succession of Fields,
222 La. 310, 320-2.1, 62 So.2d 495, 498 (1952), it was stated: "[T]he question
as presented before us is one of the sufficiency or the preponderance of the testimony, rather than of the credibility of the witnesses. In a situation such as this,
it has been held that the trial court has no advantage over the appellate court
in weighing the testimony and giving it proper effect." This court is apparentlysaying that the manifest error rule has no application where there is no question
of which witnesses are to be believed, but only whether or not all the testimony,
once believed, would be sufficient to make out a case. In other cases, the phrase
"preponderance of the evidence" has been used to mean about the same thing
as the manifest error rule. See Von Eye v. Byrnes, 124 La. 769, 773, 50 So. 708,
709 (1909), where the court stated that the trial court's judgment was against
the preponderance of the evidence and would have to be reversed. Likewise, a
presumption that the trial court was correct in its conclusions - which would
seem to be synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence idea - has been
used in lieu of the manifest error rule in order to affirm a trial court judgmnt.
Ansley v. Stunart, 123 La. 330. 48 So. 953 (1909). In Kendrick v. Kendrick, 232
La. 1104, 96 So.2d 12 (1957), the preponderance of the evidence notion was
substituted for the manifest error rule in an affirmance. In some of the early
cases, language may be found indicating that the ap)ellate court will be more
reluctant to reverse when the judgment below was for the defendant than when
the plaintiff has been successful. Naha v. Soubercase's Heir, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 493,
494 (La. 1826): Walton v. Grant, 2 Mart.(N.S.) 494, 494-95 (La. 1824)
Rachel v. St. Amand, 8 Mart.(O.S.) 363, 364 (La. 1820).
About the only thing which can be said about these cases is that notions of
the appellant's burden of establishing error and the plaintiff's burden of proof
have become inextricably entangled, this resultant tangle sometimes working in
accord with the manifest error rule, sometimes contradicting it. Further confusion
is added by the fact that some of the more modern cases have stated that it is
incumbent on the appellant to show manifest error in the judgment below before
a reversal may be secured. Smith v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 227 La. 812, 80
So.2d 418 (1955) ; Pearson v. Taylor, 116 So.2d 833 (La. App. 1959) ; Dane v.
Canal Ins. Co., 116 So.2d 359 (La. App. 1959). Apparently this is what the
language from Sunseri v. Westbank Motors, 228 La. 370, 82 So.2d 43 (1955),
quoted in the text, means.
It is believed that the following analysis comes as close as any to presenting
a logical picture of the above-described situation. At the trial level, plaintiff has
the burden of making out his case by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial
court determines that plaintiff has not made out his case. On appeal, plaintiff
must show error in the judgment below, i.e., he has the burden of establishing
error. See Pisciotte v. Indemnity Co. of America, 164 La. 260, 113 So. 840

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

proposition that the manifest error rule is "but a splendid affirmation in determining evidence taken by another court"'"
(this court seemingly visualizing the manifest error doctrine as

something of an inter-judical rule of comity). Definitory statements of the manifest error rule will frequently appear diametrically opposed. Thus, in one case, the statement was made
that the trial court will be reversed whenever there is "reasonable certainty of error"; 1 in another, it was stated that the
lower court will be reversed only if there is no "evidence of record which ... supports" the finding. 14 These latter two statements appear especially illustrative of the wide discrepancy as
to the meaning of manifest error which may regularly be observed in the cases.' 5 The statement that the trial court will be

reversed provided there is reasonable certainty of error may be
interpreted as meaning that very little weight will be given the

conclusions of the trial judge, the appellate court merely making
reasonably certain that the trial court is wrong before reversing.
On the other hand, the statement that the trial court's findings
will be affirmed if there is evidence of record which supports
them carries with it the idea that any shred of evidence will be
seized upon in order to uphold the trial court's conclusion. These

two statements, both taken from Louisiana Supreme Court cases
(1927). But this burden is the same, whether or not the appellant was plaintiff
or defendant below, whether or not the trial court determined that plaintiff made
out his case or did not make out his case. The burden of proof which plaintiff
bore in the trial court enters the manifest error scene only as an index of what
facts it was necessary for the trial court to find in order to reach its decision.
Whether appellant be defendant or plaintiff, his burden of establishing error should
be exactly the same.
Furthermore, it does not seem that either appellant should have the burden
of establishing manifest error in the judgment below. The manifest error rule is a
guide by which the appellate court measures the extent to which a presumption
in favor of the trial court's correctness will be exercised, but it seemingly should
have no application to the burden of establishing error.
12. Olivier v. Abunza, 226 La. 456, 461, 76 So.2d 528, 530 (1954).
13. McMillian v. Louisiana Mfg. & Mercantile Co., 125 La. 854, 862, 51 So.
1013, 1016 (1910).
14. Basile v. Taranto, 124 La. 677, 679, 50 So. 649, 650 (1909).
15. Other definitory statements of a broad manifest error rule include: "not
prone to disturb the findings" (Gravity Drainage District v. Key, 234 La. 201.
211, 99 So.2d 82, 87 (1958)) ; "conclude with reasonable certainty that the . . .
trial judge correctly resolved the facts" (Psayla v. Thomas, 177 La. 1019, 1022,
150 So. 5, 6 (1933)) ; "presumption that the conclusions reached by the trial
court were correct" (Ansley v. Stuart, 123 La. 330, 341, 48 So. 953, 957 (1908)).
Some narrower definitions: "not proper to reverse . . . unless . . . clearly
unsupported by evidence" (Carlisle v. Steamer Eudora, 5 La. Ann. 15, 16
(1850)) ; "the conclusion . . . does not appear to us to be so violently opposed
to the entire evidence of the case as to require the interference of this court"
(Jordan v. White, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 626, 628 (La. 1826)) ; "no such evident error
. . . as to require . . . reversal" (Soubie's Executor v. Beale, I Mart.(N.S.) 95,
96 (La. 1823)).

1961]

COMMENTS

involving review of findings of fact made by a trial judge in a
civil proceeding, seem to represent two extremes of scope of review. It would thus seem that the elasticity of the manifest error
16
doctrine is difficult to overestimate.
Applicability of the manifest error rule. Some areas of divergence among the cases are not so readily explained in terms
of the flexibility of the manifest error doctrine. Thus, there appear to be two lines of cases on the question of whether the limi-

tation applies only as to findings of fact based upon the trial
court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or rather as to
any finding of fact made at the trial level. 17 The cases stating
16. Not only may divergence in views as to the extent of proper application
of the manifest error rule be found among different cases, but there are instances
of apparent discrepancy within the same case. The manifest error rule has been
cited for the purpose of upholding the lower court's finding as to liability, but
semingly ignored in the same case for the purpose of reducing the quantum
awarded below. Dozier v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 116 So.2d 185 (La. App.
1959). In Norman v. State, 69 So.2d 120, 131 (La. App. 1953), the court of
appeal affirmed the judgment of the lower court in a jury case with the following
statement: "As a practical proposition the reasons for this restriction are obvious.
Unquestionably it is intended for the purpose of lending weight and persuasive
influence to the effect of the actions of a trial court upon the considerations of
an appellate tribunal. It emphasizes the distinction between a court of first
instance . . . and an appellate tribunal." In spite of this relatively cogent statement of the rule, however, the Supreme Court in the same case reviewed the
conflicting testimony of witnesses, weighed their credibility, and reversed the
judgments of the court of appeal and the trial court without mentioning the
manifest error rule. Norman v. State, 227 La. 904, 80 So.2d 858 (1955).
17. Probably the strongest authority discovered for the proposition that the
manifest error rule is applicable regardless of the nature of the factual conclusions being reviewed is Schlesinger v. Fontenot, 235 La. 47, 61, 102 So.2d 488,
493 (1958), where the statement was made: "[W]here the issue involved is one
purely of fact a fair and sound analytical disposition thereof by the trial judge
warrants an affirmance." Almost equally strong authority is State v. Ragusa,
234 La. 51, 99 So.2d 20 (1958), an expropriation case where the issue for review
was whether the trial judge arrived at a proper method of evaluating expropriated property. Cases which state the manifest error rule without limiting it
to credibility questions include Jones v. Jones, 232 La. 102, 93 So.2d 917 (1957) ;
Huber v. Ed Taussig, Inc., 228 La. 1018, 84 So.2d 806 (1956) ; Kruse v. Kruse,
175 La. 206, 143 So. 50 (1932) ; Burt v. Burt, 160 La. 387, 107 So. 234 (1926).
Cases indicating that the manifest error rule applies, but with somewhat less
effect, when the question is one other than credibility include Kendrick v. Duconge, 236 La. 34, 106 So.2d 707 (1958); Orlando v. Polito, 228 La. 846, 84
So.2d 433 (1955) ; Adcock v. Palmer, 179 La. 131, 153 So. 538 (1934) ; Psayla
v. Thomas, 177 La. 1019, 150 So. 5 (1933) ; Yarbrough v. Marks, 168 La. 57,
121 So. 300 (1929) ; Shaw v. Carter, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 689 (La. 1830). See also
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), which sets forth the federal "clearly erroneous" rule, and
contains the phrase: "and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."
Square statements to the effect that the manifest error rule applies only
where the factual questions for review turn upon an analysis of the credibility
of witnesses who testified in open court may be found in Succession of Fields,
222 La. 309, 319-20, 62 So.2d 495, 498 (1952) and in Jordan v. Jordan, 175 La.
468, 474-75, 143 So. 377, 378 (1932). It is interesting to note that in both these
cases, following fairly lengthy explanations of reasons why the manifest error rule
had absolutely no application, the court states that the trial court judgment in
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that the doctrine limits review only where the trial court's
factual conclusions are based upon an evaluation of demeanor
evidence, leaving the appellate court free to substitute judgment
as to other findings, proceed upon the theory that the only reason
for limiting the appellate court in its re-examination of the facts
is that the trial court, having seen the witnesses and heard them
testify, is in a better position to decide whether and to what extent to believe them than is the appellate court, confronted with

only a cold record.'

On the other hand, cases stating that the

the case was manifestly erroneous. Further support for the position that the
manifest error rule applies only when credibility is at issue may be gleaned from
the fact that there is some indication among the early cases that at its inception
the rule applied only as to credibility matters. Carlisle v. Steamer Eudora, 5
La. Ann. 15 (1850) ; Jordan v. White, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 626 (La. 1826) ; Henderson v. Beale's Curator, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 228, 229 (La. 1826); Boissier's Syndics
v. Belair, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 29 (La. 1824). Perhaps contra earlier cases are Shaw
v. Carter, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 689 (La. 1830) ; Walton v. Grant, 2 Mart.(N.S.) 494
(La. 1824) ; Boismarre v. Jourdan, 1 Mart.(N.S.) 304 (1823).
Cases lending support to the proposition that the manifest error rule is applicable only in credibility matters (through stating the reason for the rule as
being that the trial judge sees and hears the witnesses and thus is in a better
position to determine credibility questions) include Diez v. Diez, 219 La. 575, 53
So.2d 677 (1.951) ; Trascher v. Ducote, 178 La. 925, 152 So. 567 (1934) ; Guillory
v. Fontenot, 170 La. 345, 127 So. 746 (1930) ; Gore & Lambert v. Vidal, 15 La.
479 (1840).
18. E.g., Jordan v. Jordan, 175 La. 468, 474-75, 143 So. 377, 378-79 (1932)
"Counsel for defendant has referred us to many cases in which it was said by
this court that judgments of trial courts based purely upon questions of fact are
entitled to great weight and will not be set aside unless manifestly erroneous.
We need not cite them here-they are numerous, and we here take occasion to
say again that it is with reluctance that we disturb such judgments. The reason
is that the trial judge sees and hears the witnesses-we do not. This is a great
advantage, because by seeing and hearing them, the trial judge is enabled to form
some estimate of their intelligence and veracity. By observing their manner of
testifying, their attitude toward the court and the case, he is enabled to form some
idea as to whether they are influenced by bias or prejudice. Having this advantage, which is not afforded the members of the appellate court, he is in better
position than they are to say what weight should be given their testimony. In
cases where the testimony is conflicting, it is often necessary, in order to properly determine the issues presented, to sift the wheat from the chaff, to separate
the sound from the unsound, the gold from the dross. lie who sees the witnesses,
who hears what they say, is in better position to do the sifting, the separating,
than he who reads what they say.
"So we defer to the judgment of trial judges as to the intelligence and veracity
of witnesses, and the weight which should be given their testimony. But further
than this, the rule invoked has no application. In the absence of any intimation
from the trial judge that he had reasons to discredit the testimony of a witness
or group of witnesses, we must assume that they are all of equal credibility,
unless the contrary appears from the written record, which is not often the case.
"In the absence of any intimation or suggestion from the trial judge to the
contrary, we must assume that his judgment was based upon what he considered
a preponderance of the testimony. Either that, or he was not satisfied that the
testimony adduced, if believed, was sufficient to sustain the action. As to matters
of this kind, trial courts have no advantage over appellate courts." It is interesting to note that at the close of this statement, the court enigmatically states:
"The trial judge manifestly erred in his judgment."
It would seem to be a fairly logical proposition that the trial court is in a
better position to decide questions of credibility. However, there is language in
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manifest error rule operates as a limitation upon scope of review

no matter what the nature of the findings of fact at issue seldom
give reasons for their view, simply resting on the statement that
the jurisprudence is well settled that findings of fact are not to
be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous.
Substitution of judgment. While it is fairly easy to see that
formulae like the manifest error rule are quite flexible, there is
greater temptation to think of the concept of substitution of
judgment as something of an absolute. However, this is not believed to be the case. Just as the manifest error doctrine is
capable of great fluctuation, representing a sliding scale of
the cases casting doubt upon the acceptability of even that proposition. In Von
Eye v. Byrnes, 124 La. 769, 50 So. 708 (1909), the Supreme Court reversed a
trial court determination that plaintiff had not been defamed by defendant during
an altercation concerning a boundary fence. The solution of the case depended
directly upon which set of witnesses was to be believed, a matter seemingly
squarely within the area of clear trial court advantage. The court, however, stated
that "appellate jurisdiction over the facts of the case compels us to reverse
verdicts and judgments when they are clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence. The same jurisdiction and the mandate of the Code of Practice compel
us to render such judgment as should have been rendered below." Id. at 773-74,
50 So. at 709. In Fridge v. Talbert, 180 La. 937, 947, 158 So. 209, 212 (1934),
the Supreme Court stated: "The consideration of written testimony by an appellate court has some advantage over the hearing of oral testimony by the trial
court. A written record furnishes the opportunity for a more mature consideration
of the stories told by the witnesses, for detecting the inconsistencies in the statements of individual witnesses, and for sifting the conflicting statements of opposing witnesses." In Owens v. Felder, 35 So.2d 671, 672 (La. App. 1948), the
statement is made: "We are reluctant to reverse the finding of a trial court based
primarily on questions of fact, but in a case such as we are presently analyzing,
it is a self-evident principle that it is occasionally easier to perceive fallacies
and inconsistencies in the record by a comparison of the various portions of the
transcribed record with other pertinent portions than it is to accurately observe
and catalogue them while listening to the oral evidence of the various witnesses
who testified during the course of trial."
Despite any plausibility which may be seen in statements like the above, it
would appear that if there is any area where the trial courts should be considered
paramount, it is the area of determining just what basic facts have emerged
from the testimony of the witnesses in a case. A cogent argument that the trial
judge enjoys a superiority of position in matters of credibility and weight of
testimony, and should therefore be accorded a great deal of respect on appeal in
regard to such matters was made by Mr. Justice Moise in Gilbert v. Heintz, 231
La. 535, 538-39, 91 So.2d 784, 786 (1956) : "[E]vidence adjusts itself in various
ways. To the judge some things will be self-evident; others will be proven by
senses; and, there are other subjects which address themselves to no palpable
standard of truth, but to human experience of human motives. The trial judge
looks at the influences which surround our fellows, and then sounds their hearts
by the plummets which he applies to his own. He is not under the same handicap
as this Court, who reads a bare transcription of testimony." This same Justice
also made a strong statement of the necessity of the trial judge enjoying a great
deal of preponderance in these matters in Rosenthal v. Gauthier, 224 La. 341,
346-47, 69 So.2d 367, 368-69 (1953) : "ITuhe long line of precedent as to not
overruling the trial judge's factual findings unless manifestly erroneous and the
uniformity of a constant repetition of this rule cannot . . . be wholly relaxed
or entirely left behind, else there would hardly be any judicial ordering or navigable lines for the development of our judicial system."
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scope of review manipulable at the desire of the individual appellate court, so the substitution of judgment rule is to a great
extent flexible. In order for substitution of judgment to amount
to an absolute standard of review, it would be necessary that the
appellate court consider the case de novo, giving no effect whatever to the conclusions of the trial court. While as to questions
of law this is no doubt sometimes done, the appellate tribunal
will probably more often feel constrained to give some weight to
the determination of the trial judge. In this factor -the
extent
to which the appellate judge will lean in favor of his brother
below - lies the flexibility of the substitution of judgment rule.
This discussion is believed relevant as an illustration of what
might be termed the futility of attempting to formulate more
rigid standards for appellate review which would allow the advocate or the student to predict the outcome of an appellate litigation. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in discussing an analogous scope of review problem: "Some scope for
judicial discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only
by falsifying the actual process of judging or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry."'
The law-fact distinction. Another facet of the law having a
direct bearing upon the flexibility of scope of review is the muchdiscussed distinction between questions of law and questions of
fact. 20 Here again much judicial discretion is evident. It is not
an inordinately difficult task to unearth cases on either side of
the question of whether a given proposition is one of law or one
of fact.2 1 The tendency of the courts to go in either direction on
19. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951).
20. See 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTATIvE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.01-30.08 (1958) ; 5
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
52.03 (2d ed. 1951) ; Phelps, What I a "Question
of Law?", 18 U. Ciav. L. REv. 259 (1949) ; Sunderland, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in Cases Where Juries Are Waived, 4 U. CHi. L. REV. 218
(1936).
The importance of the law-fact distinction for present purposes is that there
is no limitation on the power of the appellate court to review the trial court's
conclusions of law, the appellate court more or less freely substituting its own
judgment in such matters. Therefore, in order to determine whether the manifest
error limitation is applicable, it is necessary to determine whether the matter for
review constitutes a question of fact or a question of law. An illustration of the
importance of the distinction may be seen in the case of Fouquier v. Fouquier,
231 La. 430, 91 So.2d 591 (1956), where on original hearing the Supreme Court
affirmed a trial court's award of a separation from bed and board to the wife,
on grounds that the trial court had not manifestly erred. However, on rehearing,
the court reversed its original position, stating that although the trial court's
finding of fact as to mutual fault was not in manifest error, his award of the
separation to the wife was in legal error, since neither party is entitled to an
award of separation when both are at fault.
21. In The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-
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such questions in borderline situations is not unique to Louisiana, and has been explained in terms of a "practical" approach
to the law-fact distinction, as opposed to an analytical approach.22 This practical approach simply means that in areas
where the logical distinction between questions of fact and questions of law has become blurred, the courts may be influenced
in deciding whether a given question is one of law or one of fact
by their inclination that the question being considered is deserv-

ing of review, or, on the other hand, that the finding below on
the point should be left undisturbed.2 3 Thus, in a case where a
statutory term requires refinement before it can feasibly be ap-

plied to a factual setting, the refining process is not purely a
matter of fact, since more is involved than determining whether
something did or did not happen in a physical'world. Neither is

it a pure question of law, since the point at issue is not the
formulation of a legal norm or standard. The relative impossibility of adhering to the analytical approach in certain cases is

believed illustrated in the following situation. Article 2277 of
the Louisiana Civil Code24 requires "one credible witness, and
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 306 (1953), it is stated that questions such as "holder in due course, "purchaser in good faith," "possessor in good
faith," "converted," all have received diametrically opposing interpretations in the
cases.
See Talton v. Todd, 233 La. 146, 96 So.2d 327 (1957), where a nuncupative
will under public act was held by the trial court to be void, on the basis of a
finding of fact that two of the attesting witnesses had not been present when the
will was dictated by the testator, and that the notary did not read back the will
in the presence of the attesting witnesses. The trial court's written reasons dealt
almost entirely with problems as to which of the various witnesses at the trial
were to be believed, i.e., with questions of credibility. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the trial court, stating the following to be a rule of law: "Testimony of subscribing witnesses which is adduced on the contest of the will and
which, in effect, impeaches the solemn statements contained in the instrument
which by their signatures they have attested as correct, is not in itself sufficient
to overcome the presumption of validity." Id. at 151, 96 So.2d at 329.
22. 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.1-30.08 (1958); DAVIS,

Civil Procedure, 13

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT

541 (2d ed. 1959).

23. There are some Louisiana cases which give the impression that the
analytical approach to the law-fact distinction will be adhered to irregardless.
In Lazarus v. Friedrichs, 117 La. 711, 42 So. 230 (1906), the Supreme Court
went through a great deal of travail in reversing a trial court determination on
a question of whether plaintiff's services had been performed as an attorney or
as a promoter. The court throughout treated the question as one of fact, and consequently had greater difficulty in concluding to reverse than if the question had
been treated as one of law. In Brewster v. Emlet, 168 La. 326, 122 So. 524
(1929), the court treated the question of domicile as a question of fact, reviewed
the trial court's determination under the manifest error limitation, and concluded that the trial judge had manifestly erred. It would seem that in both
these cases, had the court chosen to apply the practical approach and count these
questions as questions of law, a great deal of difficulty would have been avoided.
24. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2277 (1870) : "All agreements relative to movable
property, and all contracts for the payment of money, where the value does not
exceed five hundred dollars, which are not reduced to writing may be proved
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other corroborative circumstances" to prove an agreement relative to money or movable property above $500 in value. Since
the question of whether the requirements of the article have been
complied with involves the application of a statutory standard
to a set of facts, the analytical approach settles only that the
question is one of the type traditionally termed "mixed" questions of law and fact. The complicating element is that the particular statutory standard set forth in Article 2277 is partially
concerned with credibility, a matter generally treated as a pure
question of fact. In Cormier v. Douet,25 the Louisiana Supreme
Court treated the question of whether the requirements of Article 2277 had been met as a question of fact, reviewable only to
the extent permitted by the manifest error limitation. The trial
court's judgment was affirmed. Had the Supreme Court determined that justice or other considerations demanded reversal,
it is arguable that the question would have been treated as a
matter of law, reviewable free from the manifest error restriction.
C.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that the Louisiana jurisprudence is none
too revealing as to the exact scope of appellate fact review.
Statements propounded as definitions of the manifest error rule
appear to range over the entire scale of possible formulae for
scope of review, stopping short only of absolute inviolability for
trial court conclusions at the one extreme, and of completely free
substitution of judgment at the other. The cases are divided on
the question of whether the rule applies in cases dealing with
findings of fact which are not based upon the trial court's evaluation of credibility. There is much room for flexibility and discretion in the application of even so relatively stable a concept
as substitution of judgment. Whether a particular question is
one of fact - and thus reviewable subject to the manifest error
rule - or one of law - thus leaving the appellate court free to
substitute judgment- depends to a very great extent upon
whether the appellate court's appreciation of the legal and policy
factors involved in the case dictates affirmance or reversal. To
these difficulties 2 may be added the fact that in cases where the
by any other competent evidence; such contracts or agreements, above five
hundred dollars in value, must be proved at least by one credible witness, and
other corroborating circumstances."
25. 219 La. 915, 54 So.2d 177 (1951).
26. A related difficulty in analyzing manifest error jurisprudence is that some-
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trial court's findings of fact are reversed, it is indeed rare to
find mention of the manifest error rule, save in discussions stating why the rule is inapplicable in the particular case. In other
words, where the appellate court feels, that policy or other considerations dictate that the trial court's findings of fact be overturned, often the court will find that the manifest error rule is
inapplicable, and that the trial court was simply in error, rather
than stating that this trial court's conclusions of fact are manifestly erroneous. 27 Very rarely will a statement be found to this
effect: "We think the trial court's factual determinations on this
point were manifestly erroneous. '28 Furthermore, even in the
rare case where such a statement is made, almost never have the
courts proceeded to state how, why, and in what respect the
error committed was manifest.

II.

OTHER RULES OF SCOPE oF REVIEW

Having come to the conclusion that under the Louisiana cases
the scope of appellate review depends to a large extent upon jutimes, despite the fact that in Louisiana a litigant has a constitutional right to
have the judge in a non-jury case submit a written statement of findings of
fact and reasons for judgment (LA. CoNsT. art. V1i, §43), trial courts will fail
to make clear their findings of fact, further clouding the scope of review picture.
See Brakenridge v. Brakenridge, 175 La. 208, 143 So. 51 (1932), where the
appellate court stated that it was unable to apply the manifest error rule because
no findings of fact were set forth by the trial judge. In Garner v. Freeman, 118
La. 184, 42 So. 767 (1907), relying on Halsey v. Voorhies, 7 Rob. 355 (La. 1844),
the court stated that no fact not found in the trial court's statement of facts may
receive attention on appeal.
27. One notable technique of avoiding the limitation of the manifest error
rule is to ignore it. In Meyer v. Hackler, 219 La. 750, 54 So.2d 7 (1951), the
appellate court avoided the manifest error rule by stating: "Any attempt to go
into the credibility of the witnesses would be a vain and useless thing, because the
issue here is the sufficiency of the evidence." Id. at 755, 54 So.2d at 9. Another
case where the rule was seemingly ignored was Norman v. State, 227 La. 904,
80 So.2d 858 (1955), where the Supreme Court reviewed the conflicting testimony
of witnesses, weighed their credibility, and reversed the judgments of the court of
appeal and the trial court without mention of the rule.
Sometimes, even in credibility cases, the courts will affirm a trial court finding of fact without reference to the rule. E.g., Wiener v. Crystal Oil Refining
Corp., 183 La. 879, 165 So. 131 (1935). In some of the earliest cases, the tendency appears to have been to review the record carefully, and state that the
trial court had or had not erred, without reference to the manifest error rule,
where the issues of fact turned on non-demeanor matters. See Elisle v. Voorhies,
12 Mart.(O.S.) 424 (La. 1822).
28. Cases where express findings of manifest error have been made include
Huber v. Ed Taussig, Inc., 228 La. 1018, 84 So.2d 806 (1956) ; Moore v. Lelong,
226 La. 962, 77 So.2d 729 (1955) ; Fridge v. Talbert, 180 La. 937, 158 So. 209
(1934); Brewster v. Emlet, 168 La. 326, 122 So. 54 (1929). In Succession of
Fields, 222 La. 310, 62 So.2d 495 (1952), and Jordan v. Jordan, 175 La. 467,
143 So. 377 (1932), statements that the trial court had manifestly erred were
made, but in each instance only after lengthy discussion of reasons why the manifest error rule had no application.
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dicial discretion, with the manifest error rule serving to limit
review to some undefined extent in an uncertain number of
of review rules might
cases, a brief glance at two other scope
29
prove useful for comparative purposes.
A.

The FederalSubstantial Evidence Rule"0

It has come to be settled law that a finding of fact arrived
at by an administrative agency will be upheld when reviewed by
a federal court provided there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding. 31 "Substantial evidence" has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. '3 2 It is generally stated
that the rule means that the agency will be upheld if there is a
rational basis of record for so doing. This rule developed in the
case law, having its beginnings in the rule that the reviewing
court must determine whether the administrative agency abused
its power. From this developed the idea that a finding of fact
not supported by substantial evidence is beyond the power of
the agency. The substantial evidence rule subsequently was incorporated into the majority of statutes governing administrative agencies.
In one of the early cases, substantial evidence was equated
with the amount of evidence necessary in order for a trial judge
33
to send the case to the jury, rather than directing a verdict.
From this statement, there developed the doctrine that the substantial evidence rule applies also to an appellate court's review
of findings of fact arrived at by a jury.
It seems fairly clear that the substantial evidence rule allows
only a quite narrow review; the reviewing tribunal is precluded
29. Also useful for comparison might prove the following discussions of related scope of review problems: Annot., 33 A.L.R. 745 (1924) (master in chancery) ; 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 59 (1947) (common law judgments n.o.v.) ; Com-

ment, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1118 (1959) (United States Supreme Court review of
state courts) ; Note, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 376 (1960) (appellate review where district court's findings conflict with findings of master or referee in bankruptcy).
30. Authority for the following discussion of the substantial evidence rule: 4
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 29.01-30.08 (1958) ; DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 521-38 (2d ed. 1959). Additional information was gained
from Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges, and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HAEv. L. REV. 70 (1944).
31. Insight into the Louisiana rules regarding scope of judicial review of administrative agencies may be gained from Comment, 33 TUL. L. REV. 199 (1958).
See Plantation Anhydrous Ammonia Corp. v. Anhydrous Ammonia Commission,
234 La. 869, 101 So.2d 699 (1958).

32. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
33. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939).
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from overturning a factual determination made by an administrative agency or a jury if there is anything properly in the record upon which a reasonable or rational man could base such a
finding. As a matter of fact, it has often been stated that review
under the substantial evidence rule represents the narrowest
extent practicable. By this is meant simply that a reviewing
court will ordinarily not accept bases for the trial court's findings which are less than rational.
It is interesting to speculate as to the reasons for limiting
review to the narrow extent permitted under the substantial evidence rule. As to administrative agencies the most obvious reason would be that the agency's expertise in certain matters
renders it better qualified to make findings of fact than the reviewing court. Closely connected with this notion is the further
reason that the intent of Congress in setting up the agency ordinarily may be presumed to have been to allow the agency to
handle these specialized matters, rather than leaving them to the
courts. A third reason might be that before an agency, basic
rights of an individual will ordinarily not be at issue to the same
extent as in court, thus mitigating the compelling reasons for
having a more or less complete judicial double check of the proceeding.
A basic reason for limiting appellate review of the facts in
jury proceedings to a determination of whether substantial evidence of record may be found to support the finding lies in the
traditional rationale for the jury trial- the desirability of having a panel of laymen pool their intuitive judgment, embodying
therein the underlying sense of justice and fairness of the community. 34 The desirability of incorporating into a judgment this
sense of fairness might logically dictate that the jury also decide
questions of law. However, the interest of the law in maintaining some consistency, coupled with the relative inability of the
layman to handle legal questions, requires that questions of law
be decided by the trial judge.3 5 An even more compelling reason
34. Strong argument against the desirability of jury fact-finding may be found
in Henry, Procedure in Civil Law Jurisdictions-A
Comparative Study, 2 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 401, 421 et seq. (1940). See also Jacobs v. Solomon, 219
La. 237, 244, 52 So.2d 763, 765 (1951) : "The judgment here is one by jury and
not by judge. Laws are pumped into them which they cannot comprehend, and
there is a giving of testimony they are unable to analyze or remember. They often
chafe under restraint and are in no condition of mind to analyze the masses of
evidence where a proper computation must be made by experts and instead of
being the ancillary of justice, very often become the medium of confusion."
35. Of course, there is substantial ground for arguing that, in many cases,
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for the substantial evidence limitation is the seventh amendment
to the United States Constitution, which prohibits appellate re36
view of facts which have been found by a jury.
It would seem that the cases applying the substantial evidence rule have defined it with somewhat more precision than
has been observed in the manifest error jurisprudence in Louisiana. While there is admittedly a great deal of flexibility within
the substantial evidence concept, it seems clear that the reviewing court is precluded from disturbing findings of fact in a much
greater number of cases than under the broader formulations of
the manifest error rule. On the other hand, statements of the
manifest error doctrine were discovered which seems to approximate the substantial evidence rule.
One area where the reviewing court subject to the substantial rule enjoys an equal amount of discretion as under the manifest error doctrine is that of the law-fact distinction. 37 As in
Louisiana, the reviewing tribunal will sometimes resort to the
practical approach to the distinction in borderline situations.
Moreover, it would appear that a question which analytically is
clearly factual may be treated as a question of law if the appellate court's clear appreciation of the law and policy of the case
dictates reversal.38 Especially in review of administrative agency
findings is this technique of transmuting a clear question of fact
into one of law often seen.3 9 Thus, the question of whether certain houses were held by a taxpayer for sale to customers in the
juries do make law. Thus, in a negligence case where the question of proximate
cause is sent to the jury, the jury is in actuality determining the extent of the
duty to be imposed upon the defendant. Such a determination would clearly seem
to be law-making. See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 38-96, 268-69 (1930); GREEN,
RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
36. Through the employment of a legal fiction, review under the substantial
evidence rule is counted as review of a question of law. A sufficiency of evidence
to justify the trial judge in submitting the case to the jury is counted as also
being sufficient to sustain the judgment at the appellate level. Thus, the reviewing court inquires into the facts with a view to determining if enough evidence
was properly in the record below to justify the trial judge in sending the case to
the jury. Since a trial judge's error in submitting to the jury a case supported
by inadequate evidence is counted as an error of law, the review is not of the facts,
but rather of a question of lawe. Thus, the seventh amendment poses no problem.
See Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv.
751, 757 et seq. (1957). The seventh amendment poses no problems in the case
of review of findings of fact of administrative agencies, since an agency proceeding is not deemed a "suit at common law" within the intention of the amendment.
37. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 539-62 (2d ed. 1959).

38. Id. at 529.
39. For a discussion of this transmutation technique in appellate courts genL.
REV. 751 (1957).
erally, see Wright, The Doubtful Ominiscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN.
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ordinary course of business seems to be a question of fact. However, it has been held that this is "a conclusion of ultimate fact,
which is but a legal inference from the facts," and thus subject
to review as a question of law. 40 By the same token, before there
was any law on the subject, the question of whether a woman is
capable of bearing children was clearly a question of fact. However, the courts have established a presumption
that a woman is
41
capable of bearing children until her death.
B.

42

The Federal Clearly Erroneous Doctrine

The rule as to scope of review of findings of fact made by a
federal trial judge sitting without a jury developed entirely independent of the substantial evidence rule of jury law or of
administrative law. Traditionally, the equity trial judge considered evidence taken by interrogatories out of court and by depositions, and heard no witnesses in open court. This being true,
the appellate court reviewed the entire case de novo, without
regard to the conclusions reached by the trial judge. However,
when equity began hearing witnesses in open court, this de novo
rule was abandoned, and the rule developed that in cases where
the trial judge heard witnesses and based his factual determinations upon their testimony, he would be reversed on appeal only
if these findings were clearly erroneous. This former equity
48
rule was incorporated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Although the equity "clearly erroneous" rule apparently applied
only to findings based upon demeanor testimony, the Federal
Rule was more broadly drawn, applying to all findings of fact
with special emphasis upon credibility questions. The jurisprudence under this rule seems fairly uniform, save as to the proper
scope of review of a trial judge's decision upon a "mixed " question of law and fact involving the application of a statutory defi40. Curtiss v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1956), noted in 17 Lou833 (1957).
41. 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 121 (1942).
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42. Authority for the discussion of the clearly erroneous doctrine were the
following: 2 BARRON & HIOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 11211134 (1950) ; 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
52.02-52.05 (2d ed. 1951) ; Stern,
Review of Findings of Administrators,Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis,

58 HARV. L. REV. 70 (1944).
For interesting discussion of the scope of appellate review of decisions of the
Tax Court, now subject to the clearly erroneous doctrine, see Dobson v. Commis-

sioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943) ; Altman, The Dobson Rule, 21 TUL. L. REV. 527
(1947) ; Note, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 833 (1957).
43. FED. R. Cir. P. 52(a). For a discussion of some factors undoubtedly enter-

ing consideration in adopting the rule, see Clark & Stone, Review of Findings of
Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1936).
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nition to a particular set of facts. Here, the decisions are divided
as to whether the question should be treated as a question of law
or of fact. Probably the weight of authority is that the question
is one of law and thus completely reviewable. This would seem
to be historically sound, in the light of the fact that the equity
practice from which the "clearly erroneous" rule developed was
apparently concerned only with matters of credibility.
The most widely-quoted definition of clear error is that it is
such error as will leave the reviewing court "with the definite
'44
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

If

"clear error" means this, and if substantial evidence means evidence which a reasonable person could consider adequate, it
appears quite clear that review under the clearly erroneous rule
is somewhat broader. It would seem that an appellate court
might be left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed, while still quite unprepared to say
that there is no evidence of record on which a reasonable man
could base the conclusion reached. 45 That review of a trial

judge's findings of fact should be broader than that of an administrative agency or a jury may be seen by a comparison of
the function of the appellate court in the three types of cases.
The reasons for limiting fact review to the narrow scope of the
substantial evidence rule in administrative and jury cases have
already been mentioned. On the other hand, the reasons for limiting review of the trial judge's findings of fact appear less compelling. One reason, of course, would be that the trial judge sees
and hears the witnesses, and is therefore in a better position to
determine questions of credibility. Other reasons which might
be proposed for according deference to the trial judge's conclusions of fact include the theory that the trial court may have
more time, and thus be able to give greater consideration to the
case, together with considerations of discouraging frivolous appeals and of avoiding overburdening the appellate tribunals. It
would seem that none of these reasons is of the same weight as
the historical and constitutional reasons dictating that scope of
44. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
But see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir.
1945), where Judge Learned Hand stated: "It is idle to try to define the meaning
of the phrase, 'clearly erroneous'; all that can profitably be said is that an appellate court, though it will hesitate less to reverse the finding of a judge than
of an administrative tribunal or a jury, will nevertheless reverse it most reluctantly and only when well persuaded."
45. In this situation, the appellate court would presumably reverse a trial
judge, but affirm an administrative agency or a jury, on the same finding of fact.
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appellate review of jury findings of fact be narrowly limited, nor
are they worthy of the same consideration as the expertise idea
supporting the substantial evidence rule in administrative cases.
C.

Conclusion

Scope of review under the substantial evidence and clearly
erroneous rules of federal law is quite flexible. The tests themselves are subject to a great deal of manipulation, and review-

ing courts subject to either of these rules are equally as adept
as Louisiana courts in using the distinction between questions
of law and questions of fact as a device to achieve more flexibility of scope of review.4 6 However, it does not seem that either
the substantial evidence or the clearly erroneous rule is quite as

elastic as the manifest error rule.4 7 Apparently, review under
the manifest error doctrine may range from the narrowest conceivable under the substantial evidence rule to the broadest pos48
sible under the clearly erroneous doctrine.
III.

POSSIBILITY OF FORMULATING A MORE EXACT RULE

Having concluded that the manifest error rule is so broad
and flexible as to defy definition, it becomes pertinent to inquire
46. It is interesting to note that the requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) that
findings of fact and conclusions of law be separately set forth has occasioned
criticism as overly restrictive. Hanson, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law-An Outmoded Relic of the Stage Coach Days, 32 A.B.A.J. 52 (1946).
47. Two Louisiana authorities have expressed the opinion that review under
the clearly erroneous rule is "similar" to review under the manifest error doctrine.
Flory & McMahon, The New Federal Rules and Louisiana Practice, 1 LOUISIANA
LAw REVIEW 45, 72 (1938). This view may perhaps be tempered by the fact that
there is strong indication that the clearly erroneous rule operates to extend the
scope of review, whereas, as pointed out hereinabove (see note 4 supra and text)
it seems fairly clear that the manifest error rule limits scope of review.
48. Having established at this point that review under the substantial evidence
rule is to some undefined extent narrower than under the clearly erroneous rule,
the next logical step in this inquiry might be an attempt to place the manifest
error test somewhere in relation to these other two. As pointed out hereinabove,
the state of the manifest error jurisprudence in Louisiana is such as to defy
analysis, so that no meaningful statement of what the law of scope of review
actually is can be made. It is not the purpose of this Comment to take a position on this question. However, if taking a position were absolutely essential, it
might be possible to venture the extremely timorous hypothesis that as a general
proposition, in matters of credibility the Louisiana trier-of-fact's conclusions are
accorded approximately the same weight as the findings of a jury or of an administrative agency under the substantial evidence rule. In cases involving nondemeanor evidence, or questions of inference from established facts, the scope of
review in Louisiana is perhaps somewhat broader than under the clearly erroneous
test. The sliding scale of scope of appellate review represented in the phrase
"manifestly erroneous" appears to range all the way from the narrowest review
possible under the substantial evidence rule to some point beyond the broadest
possible under the clearly erroneous rule, depending upon the nature of the factual
conclusions under consideration.
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into the possibility of formulating a rule which would specify
the extent to which findings of fact are reviewable. This might
be done by borrowing one of the tests discussed above, or by
formulating a new doctrine.
A.

Adoption of the Substantial Evidence or Clearly Erroneous
Rule

At the outset, it would seem that the substantial evidence rule
should be rejected for Louisiana purposes. As pointed out above,
one of the primary reasons for the limitation is the seventh
amendment prohibition against appellate review of jury-found
facts. Since the Louisiana Constitution provides for appellate
review of facts in a civil case, whether found by a judge or a
jury, the constitutional reason for the substantial evidence rule
seems clearly inappropriate for consideration in Louisiana. By
the same token, since the appellate court is charged with reconsideration of the facts, it seems obvious that the theory of the
jury as a pooling of lay intuitive judgment which should be accorded a great deal of deference has been considered inapplicable
in Louisiana.
The clearly erroneous rule, on the other hand, would be conceptually quite acceptable in Louisiana. However, it is not believed that its adoption would serve any particular purpose of
clarification or firming of our law, since the rule is subject to
much of the same vagueness and flexibility as is the manifest
error rule.
B.

Formulationof a New Test

The remaining possibility would seem to be the formulation
of a new test, lying somewhere within or beyond those thus far
discussed. The first step in such a task should probably be an
49
examination into the nature of the fact-finding process.
Nature of the fact-finding process. The raw material of a
trial is evidence. This may be of a variety of kinds, of greater
or lesser probative weight. All of it which is admitted at the
trial becomes the material from which conclusions of fact will
ultimately be produced. Once all the evidence is in, the trial
court arranges it into relevant groups, pertinent to a variety of
49. For comprehensive treatment of this subject, see FORKOSCIJ, ADMINISTRA§§ 245-247 (1956). See also 2 DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 16.06 (1958) ; WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF (2d ed. 1931).
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different propositions of fact. Some of it will inevitably pertain
to factual propositions not material to the instant inquiry, and
will not merit further consideration. Such evidence as is deemed
relevant to material propositions of fact will be weighed and
sifted until a primary fact emerges. This fact is arrived at by
inference, involving weighing and sifting the evidentiary facts
and deciding what they mean. The inference by which a primary
fact is arrived at may be termed the primary inference. A succession of sifting and weighing processes, of primary inferences
involving the mass of evidence relevant to each proposition, will
result in the production of other primary facts. From these primary facts, secondary inferences will then be drawn. The product of this second inference-drawing process will be the ultimate
facts, or findings of facts.
This fact-finding process may perhaps be made clearer by
means of illustration. A sues B for damages sustained in an
automobile accident involving the two parties. A is relying solely
on a statute making it unlawful to drive over thirty miles per
hour on a wet highway. In order for B to be found liable, it is
necessary that he have violated the statute. The issues of ultimate fact, then, are road conditions and the speed of B's automobile. It is stipulated that B is a young man with flaming red
hair, and that he drives a yellow Bentley automobile. At the
trial, various types of evidence are introduced. From this mass
of evidence, the trier of fact, through primary inferences, determines that it had rained approximately one-half hour before
the accident, and that witness X was driving at approximately
twenty-five miles per hour and was overtaken and passed by a
red-haired man in a yellow Bentley about one-tenth of a mile
from the scene of the accident. These findings would be primary
facts. From these facts, the secondary inference-drawing process leads the trier of fact to the conclusion that the road was wet
at the time of the accident, and that B was traveling faster than
thirty miles per hour. These would be the findings of ultimate
facts.
This illustration suggests several possibilities for formulating a more precise rule prescribing scope of appellate review of
facts. One possibility would be completely unrestricted review.
Under such a scheme, the appellate court might examine all the
evidence in the record, and, taking into consideration X's testimony that his color vision is somewhat defective, and that he is

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

unfamiliar with British automobiles, decide that X had not in
fact seen a red-haired man in a yellow Bentley. The appellate
court would here be substituting judgment on a question of credibility, by making its own primary inference as to whether and
to what extent witness X is to be believed.
A second possible rule for scope of review would be to give
a great degree of deference to the trial court's conclusions on
matters of credibility, but otherwise to exercise completely untrammelled review. Thus, the trial court's conclusion that X had
in fact been overtaken and passed by a red-haired man in a yellow Bentley would be accepted by the appellate court. However,
the reviewing court might decide on the basis of other evidence
in the record that B had arrived at the scene of the accident via
another route than the one on which X had been proceeding, and
thus that the phenomenon observed by X could not have been B.
Here, the reviewing court would be re-examining the trial court's
secondary inference, and substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.
A closely related scheme would be to accord great weight to
the conclusions of the trier of fact as to any inference of fact,
either primary or secondary, based upon demeanor testimony,
but to exercise free review as to primary and secondary inferences based upon any other type of evidence. Thus, X's statement that he had seen a red-haired man driving a Bentley, and
the trial court's conclusion that the man X saw was B, speeding
toward the accident, would be accepted undisturbed. However,
theappellate court might conclude on the basis of documentary
evidence from the weather bureau that the accident occurred at
the height of a ten-week drought, and thus that the statute had
not been violated.
It will be observed that the above suggestions are subject to
almost infinite modification and variation depending upon the
greater or lesser degree of deference to be paid to the trial
court's fact-finding at whatever level of the process is under
scrutiny. This question of deference seems to represent an irreducible area of flexibility, of judicial discretion, in the scope
of fact review. Perhaps'it can be said that the analysis of the
fact-finding process has therefore left the problem of scope of
review no clearer than before, since questions such as how much
evidence is substantial, or how much error is manifest, will still
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be presented and will still inevitably be left to judicial discretion
at some level. However, it is believed that separating the factfinding process into components may have served some purposes
of clarification, at least to the extent that the nature of the questions inherent in the broad problem of scope of review have been
pointed up. Further, it is arguable that perhaps the problem of
scope of review could be made less complex and the rules less
elastic by eliminating the element of flexibility or discretion at
certain levels of the process. This, of course, would be done by
making the trial court's conclusions inviolable at these levels.
Considerations involved in adopting a rule of appellate fact
review.50 Having examined to some limited extent the nature
of the fact-finding process, with a view to exploring various
possibilities for formulating a more definite test for scope of
fact review, consideration will now be given to some factors
believed pertinent to the decision of whether a broad, narrow,
or intermediate rule should be adopted.
(a) factors weighing toward narrow review
Two types of factors are here involved. Considerations going
to the possibility that in some areas the trial court may be better
equipped to make factual determinations than the appellate
court will be discussed separately from broader policy considerations, going to the philosophy of appellate fact review.5 '
The most frequently stated reason for the manifest error
rule is that the trial court sees and hears the witnesses, and is
therefore in a better position to determine questions of credibility than is the appellate court, confronted with only a cold
record. This reason is based on the theory that certain aspects
of the trial, primarily demeanor of the witnesses, upon which a
decision as to credibility will be predicated are incapable of
being incorporated into a written record, and thus may be considered only by the trial judge. It should be noted that the
question of credibility embraces much more than simply whether
a witness has intentionally falsified, including matters relative
to accuracy of perception, memory, and the ability to observe
and to communicate. In the words of Justice Moise: "The judge
50. For one approach to some of the broad jurisprudential problems involved
in such an analysis, see FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949).

51. A thoughtful argument for narrow review which relies to some extent upon
both these types of factors is Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957).
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sees and hears the witnesses, and sounds their hearts by the
plummets he applies to his own. ' 52 While it is doubtless true
that the physical aspect of a witness will often be highly relevant
to a determination of his veracity and intelligence, there is another side to the story. For example, it has been stated by some
courts that the appellate court will often be in a better position
to decide questions of credibility, since on appeal the entire
record may be examined at more leisure, and inconsistencies
within the testimony of a single witness and among the statements of various witnesses may be observed. Further, it is possible to argue that the appellate court may be able to give more
objective consideration to the testimony, having in a sense been
more remote from the case. Despite these arguments, however,
it is believed that the proposition that the trial court is better
equipped to determine questions of credibility is well taken in
the vast majority of cases where such questions arise.
Closely related to the question of credibility, but, it is submitted, a separate question, is that of the interpretation to be
placed upon the testimony of a witness. The courts have apparently not viewed this as separate from the question of credibility. However, it is believed that there is a clear difference
between the two questions, as illustrated by the hypothesis set
out above involving the red-haired tortfeasor. In that illustration, the question of whether witness X's testimony to the effect
that he was overtaken and passed by a red-haired man driving
a yellow Bentley is to be believed is a question of credibility
only, and under the approach taken by the Louisiana courts,
clearly one for the trial court alone, unless the appellate court
can discover manifest error in the trial court's conclusion. However, the inference to be drawn from this piece of testimony,
once accepted, to the fact that the driver observed by X was in
fact B, is an entirely different matter. This inference would
be part of the secondary inference process, and it is difficult to
see why the trial court has any particular advantage in drawing
it. It is the view of this writer that this question should be
considered as entirely separate from the question of credibility,
and that the factors indicating that the trial court has an advantage in answering credibility questions have no application
here.
A third factor which might give the trial court some ad52. Rosenthal v. Gauthier, 224 La. 341, 344, 69 So.2d 367, 370 (1.953).
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vantage in fact-finding matters is again dependent upon the
fact that the trial court has the opportunity to observe fleshand-blood witnesses. If evidence is taken which is confused or
uncertain, the trial court has the advantage of being able to
ask questions of the witnesses in order to clear up any haziness
which may exist in the facts. However, it should be kept in
mind that once the trial court has questioned a witness, any
material thereby elicited will be part of the record, and at the
disposal of the reviewing court.
Since the trial judge is a member of the same community
as the litigants and attorneys with whom he will ordinarily be
confronted, the question arises as to whether his knowledge of
the individual propensities of attorneys, or of other habituees
of the court, such as frequent medical experts or extremely
litigious citizens, should be taken into consideration in deciding
how much weight to give his conclusions. The law appears fairly
well settled that the individual propensities of a witness or a litigant are not proper subject for judicial notice.53 This rule would
appear to preclude arguing for greater deference to the trial
court on the basis of such knowledge. The same principles appear applicable to any special knowledge the judge may have of
attorneys. If the knowledge is a proper subject for judicial notice, the fact of notice should be noted and made part of the
record of the case. If not a proper subject for judicial notice,
certainly the matter should not be given any consideration. The
fact that such matters may in many cases receive consideration
does not appear to justify a theoretical argument for greater
deference to the trial court.5"
53. See, e.g., Miranne v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 54 So.2d 538, 540
(La. App. 1951), wherein it was stated: "Judicial knowledge is limited to what
a judge properly may know in his judicial capacity, and he is not authorized to
make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally known, the basis of his
action. Courts may properly take judicial notice of the facts that may be regarded
as forming part of the common knowledge of every person of ordinary understanding and intelligence." Cf. Coltharp v. Hearin Tank Lines, Inc., 239 La. 445, 451,
118 So.2d 881, 883 (1960), wherein the following statement of the district judge
was quoted with approval: "It probably should be said now that the Court in
arriving at the conclusion it has reached . . . has given great weight to Trooper
Chance's testimony. Mr. Chance has been a State trooper for more than five years
and of course during that experience has investigated many traffic accidents. As
a matter of fact, he has been a witness in this Court on a number of occasions.
His testimony is always straightforward, clear and concise, and has always impressed the Court as being wholly trustworthy."
54. In Martel v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 118 La. 391, 394, 42 So.
975, 976 (1907), the court stated: "The [trial] judge has special opportunity to
judge of the value of the services of the sheriff from personal observation. This
court has not that opportunity on appeal." (Emphasis supplied.)
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As stated above, the major reason for according great deference to the findings of fact of administrative agencies is that
these agencies are considered to be expert in certain matters,
and thus better able to make factual determinations than the
reviewing courts. Consideration of this expertise idea gives
rise to the question whether there might be situations where
trial judges develop some type of expertise regarding frequently
litigated matters. For example, in a district where oil and gas
litigation frequently arises, might not the judge have become
something of a special expert in these matters? That this is a
definite possibility seems beyond argument. However, there
appears to have been no consideration of this factor in the cases.
Whether or not it should be given consideration in determining
the extent to which the appellate court should review the facts
of the case is open to question. One factor which would have
to be taken into account in making such a decision would be
whether it would be desirable to have different rules of review
for different trial courts. There are strong arguments against
this, based upon the desire of the law for uniformity and consistency. It is believed that different scope of review rules for
different trial courts might also give rise to serious questions
as to the rights of individual litigants in the one court or the
other.
Inquiry into the amount of time available to the trial court
for reaching a decision, as compared to the appellate court, appears relevant in deciding whether the trial court is superior
to the appellate court in fact-finding matters. Closely related to
this matter is the question of whether any difference in rules
of review should be made when the trial judge decides the case
at the hearing, as opposed to when he takes the case under
advisement. These are questions which have apparently not
received any degree of treatment in the jurisprudence, and to
which this writer is unable to suggest any definitive answers.
However, it may be timorously advanced that nothing appears
in any of the cases to negative the presumption that the appellate court is usually going to be at least equally competent with
the trial judge in finding facts.
Thus, there appear no compelling arguments that the trial
court enjoys any advantage over the appellate court in any area
except the relatively narrow one of credibility. 5 This being
55. Other, relatively unimportant, areas where it might be said that the trial
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true, it follows that in matters of secondary inference, and of
primary inference from any kind of evidence other than demeanor testimony, the appellate court is in as good a position
as is the trial judge to reach conclusions of fact. Whether, aside
from this area, this means that the appellate court should review
the facts free of any restraint will be discussed hereinafter. 56
Foremost among what might be termed policy factors indicating that a great deal of weight should be given the conclusions of the trial court is the idea that the proper place of the
appellate court in the judicial scheme is the function of insuring
that the jurisprudence maintains a certain minimum standard
of consistency, rather than working justice on behalf of the
individual litigant. When the relative numbers of trial and appellate tribunals are considered, it becomes apparent that some
function other than re-examination of each case must have been
envisioned for the appellate courts. The theory runs that, consistency and uniformity being the function of the appellate court,
no reason can be advanced for any extended inquiry into the
facts of the individual case at the appellate level, beyond seeing
that the findings of fact do not depart from some hypothetical
norm or standard of consistency.
This function of the appellate courts is perhaps most clearly
seen with regard to the question of quantum. It can be argued
that the appellate courts should examine quantum with a view
to keeping the award of damages somewhat consistent. The
courts have not distinguished quantum from the usual factual
questions, however, simply stating that the question of quantum
is reviewable subject to the limitation of the manifest error
rule.5 7 It would seem that a valid distinction could be made as
to the extent of review in quantum cases, since the policy of the
judge is at a certain advantage over the appellate court in making the proper
factual determinations include the situation where the trial judge visited the scene
of an accident or other occurrence. See Rausch Co. v. New Orleans Great Northern R.R., 176 La. 257, 145 So. 532 (1933) ; Lehon v. New Orleans Public Service,
Inc., 123 So. 172 (La. App. 1929).
56. In reality, this raises the issue of the proper function of the appellate
court. If the appellate court be taken to be for the purpose of maintaining a uniform jurisprudence, with the burden of working justice in the individual case left
to the trial court, then presumably the appellate court would defer to the trial
court on many matters of fact-finding, despite its equality of competence. Supporters of this position would point out that there is no real reason to suspect
trial courts of any inferiority. to appellate courts, and that the relative numbers
of trial and appellate tribunals indicate that full review of all trial court factfinding process was probably never envisaged.
57. E.g., McFarlain v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 118 La. 537, 542, 43
So. 155, 157 (1907).
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law here toward consistency could be said to outweigh whatever reasons might be vouchsafed for narrow review.58
Since the trial judge is a member of the community from
which the litigants facing him will ordinarily be drawn, it is
plausible to argue that his feeling for the prevailing sense of
fairness and justice in the community is important to the proper
disposition of cases, and should entitle his conclusions to a great
degree of weight on appeal. Since Louisiana judges are elected
officials, this position is not without logical merit. Also in line
with this consideration of the trial judge as an elected official
is the problem of possible deleterious effects of reversal upon
the popular respect in which he is held. Admittedly, these are
not the kinds of factors which ordinarily receive consideration,
but doubtless there is some thread of theory in the idea of elected
judges which is relevant for present purposes.
Another factor which is closely related to the idea that the
trial judge's appreciation of the sense of fairness and justice
in the community is important in deciding how much weight to
give his decisions is the notion that the faith of the public in
the stability of their law and justice should be preserved in as
healthy a condition as possible. This idea weighs rather heavily
toward avoiding reversal whenever possible, as does the related
administrative consideration of discouraging multiplicity of
appeals.
(b) factors weighing toward broad review
Probably the foremost factor weighing toward broad powers
of appellate review of facts is that the individual litigant will
doubtless stand a better chance of being justly dealt with if he
is assured of a complete double check of any litigation in which
he may be involved.5 9 This idea is, of course, the basis for ac58. For discussion of quantum review in federal courts, with some mention
of state law, see Note, 20 TuL. L. REv. 275 (1945).
59. For an interesting argument for broad appellate review, see Bullis, Louisiana and Federal Appellate Court Practice, 19 TuL. L. REv. 236 (1944).
The
author states, id. at 243-44: "It may be objected that this is the 'adding machine'
theory of justice, and that justice is never so simple as two plus two equals four;
that the nearest approach to perfect justice is for the judges to do as one prominent appellate court judge said: 'I listen to the arguments of both sides, decide
which side ought to win, then find facts and law to sustain a decision for that
side.'
"This would be true if judges were supermen. But only God Almighty knows
infallibly what is justice in every case. It would seem that every litigant is entitled to have a disinterested appellate judge weigh all of the facts in the record
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cording parties the right of appeal and of petition for writs of
review. It would seem that argument could be made for giving
complete treatment to a case, to both the facts and the law, once
it is up on appeal or writs, on the theory that the additional
time and expense involved would be more than offset by the
added guarantee of justice to the individual litigant.
There may be a theory that appellate judges are possessed
of greater juristic abilities than are trial judges. Manifestation
of this theory may be seen in the fact that the qualifications
for holding an appellate judgeship are more stringent. This
being true, additional support may be found for allowing the
appellate judge to review the entire case, without restriction.
Closely allied with this argument for full appellate review is
the fact that there are several appellate judges involved with
each case, whereas trial judges hear and decide cases alone.
The potential effect of the possibility of more complete review upon trial judges and upon lawyers should be noted. It is
at least arguable that if judges and attorneys are aware that
cases may be reviewed in their entirety, with no special deference being paid the conclusions of the trial court, they may
exercise their roles with greater care.
(c) factors weighing toward a rule of discretion
Although it may not be readily apparent, there is a great
deal of difference between a broad rule of review and the type
of discretionary rule envisioned here. Under a rule of broad
appellate review, the reviewing court would be free to reverse
the trial court's findings in any instance of disagreement. Under
a rule of discretion, however, the degree of deference to be paid
to the trial court's factual findings would vary, depending upon
the nature of the case.
It should be noted that the discretionary rule which is being
discussed here is not the status quo. It is true that scope of
review is highly discretionary under the present state of the
law, but this discretion stems from the flexibility inherent in
pertinent to the decisive issues, and all of the pertinent law, and decide upon that
basis. ....
"Instead of the holding that the decision of the lower court should be accepted
as correct, unless clearly erroneous, efficiency should cause the recognition of the

fact that the district judge is so close to the litigants that his human prejudices
and passions might be aroused by his relations with them. This fact entitles the
appellant to an entirely independent review by disinterested judges."
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the manifest error rule and in the distinction between law and
fact, rather than from a clearly announced rule of discretion.
The discussion here envisions a stated rule which might well
prove more binding upon the judges than the present scheme,
since there would at least be fairly clearly defined limits.
A discretionary rule of appellate review might have the advantage of allowing the appellate court to ground the extent of
review upon the importance of the questions involved. The determination of the importance of the questions involved might
be based upon considerations pertinent to only the individual
case, or might involve a much broader problem, such as the
value or necessity of establishing a precedent in the area of law
under consideration.
Some consideration should perhaps be given to the extent
to which appellate judges are aware of individual propensitiesshort-comings and abilities-of trial judges, and the extent to
which consideration of such factors by the appellate court is
proper. The possibility that certain trial judges may acquire
expertise in some types of litigation has already been mentioned.
Under a discretionary rule of review, the appellate court would
be free to take such factors into account. The desirability of so
doing is, of course, an entirely different question.
IV. CONCLUSION
A variety of answers could be given to the question of what
should be the rule in Louisiana for scope of appellate review of
facts. The weight to be given to the various factors and considerations discussed will to a large extent depend upon the
individual doing the weighing. It is hoped that this discussion
of some of the problems involved, and factors to be considered,
may provoke thought and possibly action on this troublesome
subject.
David W. Robertson

